Eric Clausing / AV-TEST

Heise Security Plaza / CeBIT 2016





EVERYTHING IS A TARGET -YOUR HEALTH DATA IS NEXT

THE AV-TEST INSTITUTE



- MORE THAN 30 IT-SPECIALISTS
- MORE THAN 15 YEARS EXPERIENCE IN ANTI-MALWARE-RESEARCH
- ONE OF THE LARGEST MALWARE REPOSITORIES WORLDWIDE
- STATIC AND DYNAMIC MALWARE ANALYSIS WITH IN-HOUSE TOOLS
- 400 CLIENT- AND SERVERSYSTEMS
- 1.000 TERABYTE TESTDATA
- MORE THAN 5.000 INIDIVIDUAL AND COMPARATIVE TESTS PER YEAR
- ANALYSIS, TESTING, DEVELOPMENT, CONSULTING & SERVICES FOR VENDORS, MAGAZINES, GOVERNMENT AGENCIES & COMPANIES



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AegisLab	Ahnlab	阿里钱盾 (11,250)	S ees	ANTIY	SEARMOR SEANDROID	icovast!	AVG.	\land Avira
Daidu	Bitdefender	Bornaria	BullGuard	TOR YOUR HOME AND SMALL BUSINESS	cheetahmobile	COMODO Creating Trust Online*	Dr. Web	
Emsisoft	eset	FURTINET	F-Secure 🛜	G-Protector	GBATA	GFI [°]	HAURI	
intego	Jarviz	Juniper	К	KASPERSKY	医 金山网络	KSmobile		8 Lookout
Malwarebytes	(intel) Security 🛡	Microsoft	'eScan	NORMAN	NQmobile	NSHC	💙 panda	PCKEEPER
PLAY CASTLE	👽 PSafe	350 WWW.B60.CD	Quick Heal Security Simplified	SecurityCoverage	GentinelOne	SECRITE	SOPHOS	SUVsoft
Symantec.	岡田手机営家 1.550 8551	時間安全管家	HThreat Track	TOTAL DEFENSE		TrustGo	Trustlook	VisualThreat [®]
WEBROOT	White Gate	Zoner						









Who

... wants access to the data?

Why

... would they want access to the data?

... should you care?

How

... can they get access to the data?

WHO WANTS ACCESS?



(Cyber) Criminals



WHO WANTS ACCESS?




Users









Multi Billion Dollar Companies






- Fitness Trackers may be the next big thing with millions of users
- None or weak security concepts
- Lots of interesting and sensitive data







- What kind of **raw data** is there anyway?
 - Accelerometer
 - Pedometer
 - Heart Rate/Pulse
 - Blood Oxygen
 - GPS
 - UV Exposure
 - Ambient Light
 - Skin Temperature
 - Galvanic Skin Response
 - Notifications from the Smartphone (SMS, eMail, WhatsApp,... App Permissions!)
- What kind of data is derived from raw data?
 - Stress Level
 - Feeling
 - Sleep Tracking
 - Activity Form and Level (Walking, Running, Biking, Driving Indoor / Outdoor)
 - Distance / Locations traveled to







Von Flickr_-_Πρωθυπουργός_της_Ελλάδας_-_Angela_Merkel_-_Aντώνης_Σαμαράς_(2).jpg: Αντώνης Σαμαράς Πρωθυπουργός της Ελλάδας from Greecederivative work: César - Diese Datei wurde von diesem Werk abgeleitet Flickr -Πρωθυπουργός της Ελλάδας - Angela Merkel - Αντώνης Σαμαράς (2).jpg:, CC BY-SA 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=22908697

- Merkel mahnt, es mit dem Datenschutz nicht zu übertreiben (Don't overdo data privacy) <u>http://heise.de/-2812931</u>
- German Chancellor Angela Merkel: "Daten sind der Rohstoff der Zukunft" (Data: The Resource of the Future)



Personal Data is worth a lot of money

Company name	Facebook	LinkedIn	Yahoo	Google	
Market cap (in billions)	\$100.56	\$31.31	\$27.67	\$282.20	
Number of users (in millions)	1,110	225	627	1,300	
Revenue (in billions)	\$1.813	\$0.366	\$1.135	\$13.110	
Per user valuation	\$90.59	\$131.55	\$44.13	\$217.08	
Average Revenue per User (ARPU)	\$1.63	\$1.53	\$1.81	\$10.09	

18.04.2016

Google

YAHOO!

Linked in



Insurance Companies provide Discounts

 Vitality (Insurance Company, UK): "The healthier you get, the more we're able to offer you. It's a virtuous circle that's good for you, good for us, and good for society."

• German Insurance Companies will pay subsidies:

- "Nach der AOK Nordost hat inzwischen auch die Techniker Krankenkasse Wearables und Fitnesstracker offiziell in ihr Bonusprogramm aufgenommen – darunter auch die Apple Watch." <u>http://heise.de/-2817046</u>
- They claim they are not interested in the data (yet)
- Users may want to manipulate the data for better discounts
- Attackers may hold the data to ransom and threaten the user with loss of their discounted rates



- Tracking of users becomes even easier
 - "Security Expert Warns of Criminals Using Facebook to Plan Home Burglaries"
 - You don't even need to actively post, attackers will read the GPS of your fitness tracker
 - "Health-Schufa" (consumer reporting agency) may prevent you from getting the job, the bank loan or the wife you wanted
- "Wearable tech will transform sport but will it also ruin athletes" personal lives?"
 - By faking data you could manipulate careers or even destroy them
- Use of fitness trackers as evidence at court

Fitbit Data to Be Submitted as Court Evidence

Wearable tech numbers used for personal injury claim


Fitbit data increasingly used as court evidence

Police: Woman's fitness watch disproved rape report



- University of Illinois: Using a homegrown app on a Samsung Gear Live smartwatch, the researchers were able to guess what a user was typing through data "leaks" produced by the watches' motion Sensors. <u>https://www.ece.illinois.edu/newsroom/article/11762</u>
 - Researchers were essentially able to guess passwords
 - Android malware is on the rise. It could simply implement this as well





HOW CAN THEY GET ACCESS?



- AV-TEST evaluated the security of 9 popular fitness trackers, results are available at
 - https://www.av-test.org/en/news/news-single-view/test-fitness-wristbands-reveal-data/
 - https://www.av-test.org/fileadmin/pdf/avtest_2015-06_fitness_tracker_english.pdf
- Majority of devices had security issues that allowed unauthorized local or remote acces to the data or even the manipulation of data

Security issues were reported to several vendors

- Fitbit released a firmware update fixing two critical security issues after working on this with us for a few weeks
- Others did not reply at all and devices are **still vulnerable**

HOW CAN THEY GET ACCESS? (Example 1)



- Live-Data, provides Fitness Data without authentication
- Notifications can be enabled to share the data in (near) real time
- Fixed!



HOW CAN THEY GET ACCESS? (Example 1)



Replay Attack to manipulate data

- Device Time and Alarm clock can be changed
- Fitness Data can be erased


Fixed!

00000000 03000000 20202020	00000000 20 <mark>535445</mark>	02702852 20011000 50474545	09002911 00000020 4B202048	00D402A6 20202020 49205448	Welcome Text "STEPGEEK HI THERE HOWDY"
00000000 00000000 04000000 FFC0FC0F	20484F57 00000000 00000000 14820000 C0FC0000 FFC0FC0F	00000000 00000000 1C020110 BC7F0000	0000 <mark>45B2</mark> 00000000 0DFC0FC0 1C020110	4C550000 00000000 FC0FC0FF 0DFC0FC0	UNIX Epoch → Tracker Systemtime
0DFC0FC0 1C020110 04000000 38B24C55	FC0FC0FF 0DFC0FC0 05 <u>45B24C</u> 04000000 03F0381C	FFC0FC0F FC0FC0FF 550238B2 01102700	C0FC0002 FFC0FC0F 4C550124 80000000	E8800000 C0FC0003 B24C5504 000AFFF0	UNIX Epoch → Alarm Clock time
00000000 04000000 00000000 06000000		3F03F03F 000AFFF0	03F0381C 3F03F03F 00000900 00000000	00000000 03F0381C 01234798 00000087	
0100 C002	00000000	000002A	20000000	00000091	

HOW CAN THEY GET ACCESS? (Example 2)



- Rebranded and distributed by several vendors (e.g. Acer)
- Pairing
 - Requires a PIN
 - 4-digit Hex-Code
 - Problem: "Code" can be extracted from the device name
- Manipulation



- Original App uses a library to communicate with the tracker, this library can be (ab)used by anyone, no obfuscation, no other security measures
- It was possible to write a fake App that has full access to the tracker and is able to manipulate the data
 - New World Record 5000m Run: 8min with 1000 steps!

HOW CAN THEY GET ACCESS? (Example 3)



- Authentication
 - Original-App checks Characteristics and MAC-Address (first few bytes) to verify authenticity of the device
 - Tracker does not perform any checks of Smartphone or App → Anyone can connect
- After successful connection (and without authentication) data / tracker functions can be manipulated
 - User information (height, weight, etc.)
 - Factory reset

HOW CAN THEY GET ACCESS?



• Why is that so?

- Vendors don't think about security at all. One reply we got from a vendor: "Why would anyone hack a fitness tracker?"
- Vendors have **no experience or knowledge** in the IT Security field
 - Even if they try to implement security, they fail
 - Old mistakes are repeated over and over again:
 - No authentication, broken authentication implementation
 - No encryption, bad encryption implementation
 - Mistakes we have seen 10 or 15 years ago in the traditional IT
- Tight deadlines, market demands, features always come first
 - Fixing security after something happened is always more work and more expensive

Final Remarks



Should users completely abandon these devices?

- No, but they should be aware that a lot of devices will give away more information than they expect
- There are **devices** that have a **robust security** implementation
- Right now there are no known real-world attacks to fitness trackers. The possibility is there, but attacks will only be carried out on a larger scale when someone gains benefit from this.
- Should insurance companies really give discounts based on fitness tracker data? Should fitness data be used as court evidence?
- There is much more to come. Criminals (and companies) are way more creative and better in finding ways to monetarize this data
- Even legitimate ways to get (more or less) unauthorized access to your data are imaginable (The resource of the future!)





Thank you very much for your attention!